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A B S T R A C T
Underlying several theories of European integration is the
idea that countries’ willingness to sign up to supranational
rules is dependent on the expectation and/or realization of
various benefits. In this paper, we explore whether such
benefits also affect member states’ implementation of these
rules. Using econometric techniques, we estimate the in-
fluence of several measures of membership benefits on 
the annual number of legal infringements received by 15
member states over the period from 1978 to 1999. Our results
provide qualified support for the idea that benefits positively
influence compliance. We find that greater intra-EU trade
dependence and voting power in European institutions
relative to population size are negatively associated with
legal infringements. Yet, contrary to a priori expectations, net
fiscal transfers are positively correlated with infringements.
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Introduction
Although policy-making in the European Union (EU) remains highly central-
ized, responsibility for implementation ultimately resides with national
administrative actors. Evidence suggests that the extent to which these actors
have discharged this responsibility has varied considerably. Statistics on the
number of infringement proceedings raised by the European Commission
point to significant differences – both between and within individual member
states over time – in the degree of compliance with Treaty obligations to
implement EU policy (Börzel, 2001).
Such variations have not escaped the attention of academics. In recent
years, scholars of European governance have advanced a wide range of
explanations for spatio-temporal variations in member state (non-)compliance.
Broadly speaking, these explanations have centred around two basic determi-
nants (Börzel, 2000; Falkner et al., 2004; Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998). The
first is the ability of administrators to comply with EU policy, and the second
their willingness to do so. The focus of our article is on this latter set of
determinants.
Typically, differences in the willingness of administrators to comply have
largely been explained according to the degree of compatibility (‘goodness-
of-fit’) between EU policy requirements and domestic institutional character-
istics (Bursens, 2002). In this article, however, we examine a different and
altogether less well researched thesis. Specifically, we explore the possibility
that variations in the willingness to comply are shaped by the extent to which
national actors benefit from EU membership. Membership benefits would
appear to offer considerable explanatory potential in the present context. The
EU is a supranational body that effectively distributes costs and benefits
between individual member states (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1994: 510). Yet the
distribution of these costs and benefits is uneven. It is our contention that
member states that derive greater benefits from the EU will demonstrate
higher levels of compliance.
With a view to empirically scrutinizing this thesis, we use econometric
techniques to estimate the influence of several hypothesized measures of
membership benefits on the number of annual infringements for 15 member
states over the period 1978–99. Our study is unique in two important respects.
First, we go far further than past studies in investigating the influence of
different membership benefits. Although past quantitative research has
examined membership benefits, it has often done so by proxy, using Euro-
barometer data on public support for the EU (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998;
Mbaye, 2001). Yet there is growing recognition that public attitudes are, at
best, a blunt measure of membership benefits. Recent work therefore shows
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that, as well as objective benefits, citizens’ attitudes towards European inte-
gration are strongly influenced by their perceptions of the performance of
domestic political institutions (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Kritzinger, 2003;
Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). By contrast, our study centrally analyses a total of
three conceptually distinct membership benefits, derived respectively from
Europe-wide trade rules, fiscal redistribution and the apportionment of votes
in European law-making institutions. In doing so, we attempt to provide a
more proximate, wide-ranging and disaggregated analysis of the influence of
national gains on compliance with EU policy.
Second, although adopting the number of reasoned opinions as our prin-
cipal measure of non-compliance, we additionally analyse non-compliance at
a further stage of infringement proceedings, namely, referrals to the European
Court of Justice (ECJ). Significantly, we demonstrate that our main results are
consistent across both stages, suggesting that the influence of membership
benefits is not simply confined to the reasoned opinions stage of Commission
proceedings.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. First, we outline
the nature and enforcement of directives. Then we introduce three key
membership benefit variables hypothesized to explain variations in legal
infringements. After describing our research design, we present our results.
As anticipated, both levels of intra-EU trade dependence and per capita
voting power in European institutions are negatively correlated with the
number of infringements received by the Commission. However, contrary to
expectations, higher levels of net fiscal transfers are associated with more
legal infringements. The last section concludes and discusses the wider
implications of our findings.
Complying with the EU Directives
The most important form of EU law – and the focus of the present study – is
the Directive. Under the Treaty of Rome, responsibility for implementing
Directives falls to competent authorities within member states, who must
complete two steps in order to comply with European legal requirements.
First, they must formally incorporate (‘transpose’) Directives into national
law. And, second, states must institute appropriate administrative measures
to ensure that Directives are effectively applied and enforced on the ground
(Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998: 233; Weale et al., 2000: 297). Breaches of Treaty
obligations can occur at either of these stages. Thus, non-compliance may
arise from late and/or incorrect legal transposition of Directives, or else from
failure to institute adequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
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Where the Commission suspects a state of not fulfilling its obligations to
implement EU law, it is empowered under the Treaty of Rome to launch
infringement proceedings (Davies, 2001: 87). These proceedings invariably
begin informally with a series of bilateral discussions between the
Commission and the competent national authorities. Where dialogue and
mediation fail, infringement proceedings may become formal in nature. These
formal proceedings take place over three sequential stages. In the first, the
Commission issues a ‘formal letter of notice’, in which the relevant state is
asked to submit its observations regarding the suspected breach. If the formal
letter fails to resolve the dispute, a ‘reasoned opinion’ may be served against
the concerned state, setting out the Commission’s view of how the member
state has breached its legal obligations and establishing a timetable for action
(Börzel, 2001: 806–8; Cairns, 2002: 122–4; Davies, 2001: 87–9). Continued non-
compliance with the terms of the reasoned opinion may prompt the
Commission to move to a further stage: ‘referral to the European Court of
Justice’.
The European University Institute in Florence has compiled data on the
annual number of infringement cases taken against individual member states
for the period 1978–99. Table 1 shows reasoned opinions – aggregated over
three-year blocs for ease of exposition – for this time period. The table reveals
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Table 1 Number of reasoned opinions issued (aggregated over three-year periods)
Year 1978–81 1982–84 1985–87 1988–90 1991–93 1994–96 1997–99
Austria – – – – – 2 113
Belgium 54 43 80 85 94 122 141
Denmark 12 16 13 15 10 15 15
Finland – – – – – 0 29
France 56 83 95 70 64 112 204
Germany 28 36 51 60 66 128 111
Greece 0 33 82 123 119 163 122
Ireland 19 35 42 53 65 86 92
Italy 93 81 119 190 165 167 168
Luxembourg 34 16 38 47 85 73 91
Netherlands 31 24 31 43 61 33 50
Portugal – – 0 24 146 125 142
Spain – – 8 34 97 98 80
Sweden – – – – – 0 35
United Kingdom 31 21 25 34 39 50 76
Source: European University Institute’s Database on EU Member State Compliance with
Community Law.
significant differences in the number of legal infringements, both within and
between individual member states over time.
The central purpose of the present article is to explore the role of member-
ship benefits in explaining these spatio-temporal variations. Membership of
the EU provides states with a number of potential (additional) benefits that
might plausibly affect the willingness of national political and administrative
actors to implement directives. We hypothesize that spatial and temporal vari-
ations in these benefits explain some of the observed differences in legal
infringements.
Theorizing the influence of membership benefits
Although the benefits from EU membership are multiple, complex and
potentially ambiguous, there are a number of reasons they can be expected
to influence compliance with Directives. Most fundamentally, the gains from
membership are likely to influence, directly and indirectly, the willingness of
political actors to implement EU policy (Mattli, 1999; Mbaye, 2001). Two broad
mechanisms are likely to be important in this respect. The first is rational,
calculative and self-interested behaviour (Underdal, 1998). Implementing EU
policy is rarely without its costs, raising the possibility of opposition from a
wide range of market, civil society and political actors. Assuming that actors
behave rationally, therefore, it follows that compliance with EU law will be
better where derived benefits are greater. Directly, membership benefits
potentially offset some of the costs of adjusting to EU policy and are there-
fore likely to increase actors’ acceptance of EU policy (Börzel, 2000; Molle,
2001). Indirectly, to the extent that continued functioning of the EU is in the
self-interests of domestic actors benefiting from membership, it makes sense
that they should avoid jeopardizing its workings by supporting and/or
tolerating non-compliance.
More specifically, political actors benefiting directly from EU member-
ship are likely to show a greater willingness to support and expedite the
passage of EU Directives into domestic law and to devote greater resources
on the administrative infrastructures required for the practical application of
these Directives. Lower-level administrative actors charged with designing
measures to transpose and/or practically implement Directives might also be
less prone to policy delay and/or ‘bureaucratic’ drift (Steunenberg, 2006).
Similarly, where politically active groups such as consumers and producers
benefit or, indeed, anticipate benefiting from EU Directives, they are likely to
‘mobilize’ against instances of non-compliance, generating pressures for
political and bureaucratic actors to legally transpose and apply Directives in
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a timely and correct manner (Börzel, 2000). More generally, membership
benefits accruing to non-state actors are likely to facilitate the process of legal
transposition and implementation, by reducing the likelihood of opposition
to EU policy requirements.
Yet it seems unlikely that implementation will be driven entirely by
rational, self-interested motives (Chayes and Handler Chayes, 1993). Accord-
ing to a growing body of work, compliance behaviour is shaped by social
norms, which collectively provide a template for appropriate action (Checkel,
2001; Simmons, 1998). Within the European context, for example, Beach (2005)
has argued that member state implementation should improve as domestic
actors come to accept the normative force of EU law.
A second potential mechanism through which generic membership
benefits might influence implementation, therefore, is by strengthening the
normative power of EU law. In particular, we expect domestic actors in
countries benefiting more from the EU to be persuaded to identify with the
EU, accept the legitimacy of its laws, and find themselves ‘pulled’ towards
compliance. Conversely, the normative force of European rules is likely to be
far lower in states that derive only limited membership benefits. Indeed,
domestic actors’ acceptance of the legitimacy of EU law might plausibly be
damaged by the perception that their country is disadvantaged in some way.
Note, neither of the above instrumental or normative mechanisms relies
directly on sanctions to motivate compliance. Although compliance may be
partly driven by concerns that non-implementation may evoke a reciprocal
response from other member states, ultimately undermining the effective
functioning of the EU, we do not anticipate that states comply out of fear that
they will lose any of their wider membership benefits (e.g. fiscal transfers)
granted by European institutions and/or fellow member states. Nor do we
anticipate that states comply in the hope of securing a higher level of member-
ship benefit. Instead, the emphasis of our argument is on unconditional
membership benefits and their role in strengthening the rational incentives
and/or normative basis to comply.
These predictions are broadly supported by mainstream theories of
European integration. Although diverse with respect to the emphasis that they
place on different actors, processes and motives, integration theories are never-
theless united in the role lent to rewards and benefits. For neo-functionalists,
therefore, unification takes place as nationally-constituted elites, who believe
that their interests are served by integration, are persuaded to shift loyalties
to the supranational level (Haas, 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Nye,
1971). Similarly, for intergovernmentalists, integration is primarily driven by
the distinctive self-interests and priorities of nation-states, with critical
decisions over whether to cede authority to supranational government made
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according to the utilitarian calculations of national governments (Hoffman,
1966). More recent (‘liberal’) modifications to intergovernmentalism have also
emphasized the role of domestic societal pressures in shaping state goals,
suggesting that unification is influenced by subnational interest groups who
weigh up the costs and benefits from additional supranational integration
(Moravcsik, 1993).
In the remainder of this section, we develop three key hypotheses regard-
ing the influence of specific membership benefits on domestic implemen-
tation. Our first two hypotheses relate to the economic benefits from EU
membership, and our third hypothesis seeks to capture the potential politi-
cal advantages obtained by certain member states. We begin with intra-EU
trade.
Economic benefits: Intra-EU trade
Foremost in any discussion about the economic rewards from EU member-
ship is trade (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1994; Hitiris, 2003). Members of the EU
have benefited not only from the abolition of intra-country tariff barriers but
also from the harmonization of national standards and regulations that might
otherwise have acted as barriers to trade. Together, these developments have
reduced transaction costs, facilitated the free movement of goods and
services, and created the conditions for the realization of further economic
gains (Mattli, 1999; Molle, 2001; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998).
According to several theoretical models, it is precisely these economic
gains from a harmonized set of rules, regulations and laws that provided the
original catalyst for European integration. For traditional (Haas, 1958;
Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) and modified (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet,
1998) accounts of neo-functionalism, therefore, growing cross-border economic
transactions generated demand for European-level coordination, rules and
regulations to reduce obstacles to intra-EU trade. Similar transaction-based
motives may have also helped to sustain and reinvigorate subsequent
demands for further European integration (Mattli, 1999).
The gains obtained from market liberalization and legal harmonization
are likely to vary (Jovanovic, 2005; Molle, 2001). Specifically, we expect
member states that depend more in their trade on other EU partners to benefit
more from Europe-wide rules. Thus, the overall gains derived by consumers
– in terms of lower prices from the abolition of tariffs within the EU – will be
greater in countries that obtain a larger share of their imports from other
member states. Similarly, countries that send a larger share of their exports
to other EU countries stand to gain more from European rules guaranteeing
the security, stability and efficiency of trade (Mattli, 1999). Owing to such
European Union Politics 8(2)1 8 6
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benefits, countries with a high ratio of intra-EU trade to total trade are more
likely to support harmonized, Single Market policies at the European level.
A similar logic can be applied to the politics of implementation. Where
a country trades extensively with other EU members, and therefore benefits
from the creation and maintenance of free market rules, we expect to find
stronger support for the implementation of Directives (Hitiris, 2003). Aware
of their reliance on the functioning of the Single Market, market actors in
countries exporting a large share of their exports to other member states are
less likely purposefully to undermine EU rules, for example by lobbying
against timely and/or correct transposition. Legislators, politicians and civil
servants in such countries might similarly be expected to treat compliance
with EU Directives as a matter of wider strategic importance. In fact, both
sets of actors are likely to favour setting a good example, fearing that non-
compliance might trigger a reciprocal response by other member states in
areas related to free trade, ultimately threatening the functioning of the Single
Market. EU export-oriented countries are likely to end up losing out most
from such an outcome.
Likewise, domestic actors benefiting from obstacle-free imports and
competition rules – represented most forcefully by consumer groups – are
likely to actively monitor the implementation of EU Directives favouring their
interests. Moreover, where non-compliance is detected, they will mobilize
behind Directives, for example alerting the media and lobbying politicians
(Börzel, 2000). Where a large share of a member state’s imports is from other
EU member states, and therefore subject to EU trade and competition laws,
such pressures for implementation are likely to be stronger, reflecting the
greater losses from non-observance of EU laws.
More generally, as the gains from European trade grow, so member states’
normative acceptance of EU rules is likely to increase. Thus, we expect
(economically beneficial) trade between member states to foster growing
commitment to EU integration, in doing so naturalizing the legitimacy of
European-level law. Directly, this is likely to induce implementation as civil
servants, legislators and politicians respond to a re-scaled ‘logic of appropri-
ateness’ (March and Olsen, 1979) by legally transposing Directives. Indirectly,
growing acceptance of the EU and its laws by citizens is likely to increase
normative and instrumental (i.e. electoral) pressures on governments to trans-
pose and apply European policies, which should plausibly improve imple-
mentation (Duina, 1997). Reinforcing these internal dynamics may be
external, reputational ones (Downs and Jones, 2002; Simmons, 1998). Thus,
domestic political actors may strive to implement EU Directives in order to
avoid appearing ‘backwards’ and/or ‘uncooperative’ amongst their peers in
other member states with which they are closely linked through international
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trade. The importance of reputation has been widely invoked in the
international relations literature to explain why states – and especially states
exposed to international scrutiny through trade openness – enter into and,
moreover, comply with their international legal obligations (Chayes and
Handler Chayes, 1993). We believe that reputational dynamics may similarly
assume a regulatory role in the European context (e.g. see Lægreid et al., 2004;
Steunenberg, 2006).
Conversely, actors in countries that trade relatively little with their
European counterparts are less likely to re-scale their preferences, interests and
identities towards Europe and therefore accept the legitimacy of EU law. They
are instead more likely to continue to regard domestic law as the prime locus
of regulatory authority (Falkner et al., 2004). In fact, precisely for this reason
it should be easier for political and bureaucratic actors in countries that are
less economically integrated into the EU to ignore European Directives.
Inevitably, neither instrumental nor normative dynamics are likely to
guarantee member state compliance. Thus, whereas material incentives to
preserve the EU legal order governing competition and trade may be strong
in countries with high intra-EU trade dependence, Directives in other fields
(e.g. environmental protection) are more likely to be accepted and/or rejected
according to their respective merits.1 Similarly, where European policy
requirements are especially costly and/or disruptive, the normative power of
EU law may fall foul of short-term material imperatives (Olsen, 2002). Yet we
expect overall support for implementation to be higher in member states that
rely more heavily on intra-EU commerce as part of their total trade.
Redistributive benefits: Net fiscal transfers
Another potentially significant economic benefit derived from EU member-
ship comes in the form of fiscal transfers (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1994;
Jovanovic, 2005). Through its budgetary powers, the EU collects and re-
distributes significant financial resources. For example, the budget for the 
EU-15 in 2004 totalled €94.6 billion in commitment appropriations. The
majority of these resources is spent in just two areas, the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) and Structural Funds.
This redistributive feature of the EU budget creates fiscal ‘winners’ and
‘losers’. Thus, certain states benefit from the budget in that they are net
recipients, i.e. receiving more from the EU than they contribute. Conversely,
other member states are net donors, losing out in the overall distribution of
EU funds.
We anticipate that net recipients of EU resources will have a better 
record of implementing EU law. From a rational choice perspective, net
transfers represent potentially important financial benefits derived from EU
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membership, offsetting some of the costs of legal harmonization. In principle,
therefore, they should increase the probability of compliance. Of course,
cost–benefit calculations of this sort are unlikely to be widespread. Yet,
amongst domestic actors benefiting significantly from EU subsidies, such
considerations might plausibly assume considerable importance. Aware of
wider compensatory benefits derived from membership, groups such as
farmers may be more willing to accept the costs of complying with relevant
Directives. More importantly in the present context, they are less likely to
mobilize against legal transposition, making it easier for domestic political
actors to take the steps required to comply.
At a more general level, the redistributive economics of the EU may
influence wider acceptance of the legitimacy of the EU and normative
commitment to its laws (see Gabel, 1998; Van Kersbergen, 2000). The net
budgetary position of states often features prominently in national media
coverage of the EU, provoking considerable public debate about the merits
of integration (McCormick, 1999). Indeed, evidence suggests that the level
of fiscal transfers has a positive influence on attitudes towards the EU by
national publics and political elites (Anderson and Reichert, 1996;
Bourantonis et al., 1998; Mattilla, 2004). Thus, it follows that domestic actors
in states that are fiscal winners are more likely to conflate their interests with
Europe and therefore come to accept the normative force of EU law. As in
the case of intra-EU trade, the growing legitimacy of Europe and its laws
might be expected to influence positively, directly and indirectly, the willing-
ness of political actors to transpose and apply Directives (Duina, 1997).
Conversely, where the budget settlement is deemed ‘unfair’, we expect
resentment towards Europe and its laws. Rather than being seen as a legiti-
mate entity, the EU is more likely to be viewed as inimical to the national
interest, imposing significant financial burdens on domestic actors. Lacking
normative attachment, the underlying pressure on civil servants, legislators
and politicians to transpose and apply Directives will inevitably be lower.
Curiously, results from the only study to investigate the influence of fiscal
transfers contradict these expectations. For a sample of 15 member states,
Börzel et al. (2004) found that net transfers are positively correlated with
infringements. However, this result was derived without control variables.
Our research design is able to show whether this counter-intuitive result is
upheld once the impacts of other variables are controlled for in a multivariate
regression.
Political benefits
Although the EU remains a predominantly economic union, we nevertheless
expect political gains accruing to domestic political elites to influence the 
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logic of compliance. Such expectations are consistent with state-centric, 
intergovernmental approaches, which suggest that countries’ willingness to
cede sovereignty to the EU is ultimately determined by the extent to which
(further) integration fulfils the functional self-interests of national political
executives (Rosamond, 2000).
Within the context of the EU, one of the most potentially important
payoffs derived by political actors is the enhancement of executive capacity
and power. At the broadest level, EU integration benefits all member states,
to the extent that it provides national executives with the capacity to solve
collective action problems (Moravcsik, 1998; Wessels, 1997). Yet the EU also
provides some states with enhanced political authority relative to their size,
in that they are overrepresented in European legislative institutions.
Decisive in this respect is countries’ voting power in the Council of
Ministers and the European Parliament, the two central institutions for the
representation of member states’ interests in EU policy-making. The formula
for apportioning votes within these institutions has changed over time, in
response to both Treaty revisions and successive enlargements. However, it
has consistently favoured smaller member states, with the least populous
countries apportioned vastly more votes per head of population than the most
populous ones. This favouring of the smaller member states has been widely
noted in the literature, as has the dissatisfaction with these arrangements
amongst the larger member states (e.g. Bindseil and Hantke, 1997;
Heisenberg, 2005; Kandogan, 2005).
According to Rodden (2002), the overrepresentation of small states is
most apparent in the case of unanimous voting within the Council, but also
applies to qualified majority voting (QMV), as well as to voting in the Parlia-
ment. An important corollary is that political actors in overrepresented
countries enjoy political clout in European-level institutions far beyond their
population size. They are therefore potentially able to ‘punch above their
weight’ within intergovernmental negotiations, enhancing their historically
limited political powers. In our empirical analysis below, we use an index of
a priori voting power per capita to capture differences in individual states’
(potential) ability to influence voting outcomes within the European Council
and the Parliament relative to their size.
As with economic gains, we hypothesize that the benefits derived by
states with voting power disproportionate to their population size will
positively shape their compliance with EU law. All else equal, we expect
member states with more voting power per capita – that is, with greater
potential power to influence the outcome of votes relative to their population
size – to infringe EU law less frequently.
An obvious objection to this hypothesis, of course, is the idea that it is
not relative power that matters but absolute power. Besides, populous states
with large numbers of votes ultimately command greater absolute power to
influence EU legislative developments, and therefore are better placed to
achieve policies that suit their self-interests. Adopting a rationalist ‘goodness-
of-fit’ logic, this would suggest that such states will have a better record of
compliance, in that they will generally find it cheaper and/or less disruptive
to adapt to European requirements. Yet this argument – which equates
absolute voting power with political benefits from EU membership – over-
looks two important factors.
First, the idea that populous states with large numbers of votes, and
greater potential voting power, recurrently prevail over others and always
obtain the policies they want is not consistent with the empirical record. True,
evidence suggests that larger states exercise their veto power more frequently,
for example abstaining or voting ‘no’ against the majority within the Council
(Heisenberg, 2005; Mattilla, 2004). However, there is only limited evidence to
suggest that larger, more populous states are able to use their voting power
consistently to achieve policies that are close to their interests, preferences
and styles, and, even then, only under certain conditions (Bailer, 2004;
Mokken et al., 2000). In reality, no single member state alone commands
decisive influence over legislative proposals (Raunio and Wiberg, 1998),
suggesting that absolute voting power cannot be taken as a robust predictor
of favourable outcomes.
Indeed, where states with a large number of votes are overrun by smaller
states, we anticipate considerable resentment towards the resulting EU
policy by domestic political elites and their electorates. Historically, countries
such as Germany, France and the UK have wielded considerable power, and
generally faced limits on their authority only from other large states.
However, the overweighting of smaller countries within decision-making
forums, together with the EU’s voting rules, means that larger countries’ size
no longer guarantees them control over decisions that affect them. In the
event, policies arising from EU decision-making institutions that do not
reflect the interests of larger countries are unlikely to be easily accepted by
state or non-state actors accustomed to ‘getting their way’. Legislators and
civil servants in such countries might well be expected to face considerable
domestic pressure – especially from regulated parties – to delay trans-
position or else water down the requirements enshrined in the relevant
Directive within domestic legislation. Conversely, smaller, overrepresented
states have gained more than they have lost. Although they may not be as
(potentially) powerful as states with a large number of absolute votes, the
EU provides smaller, overrepresented states with supranational political
influence beyond their population size.
A second reason to question the political benefits as absolute power
argument is that it is not only consequentialist factors that matter. Equally if
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not more important are issues of procedural equity. Thus, scholars have long
suggested that rules are more likely to be obeyed where they conform to
commonly held notions of equity and fairness (Fisher, 1981). Applied in the
present context, this might suggest that states with more votes, or, more
precisely, greater (potential) voting power relative to their population size,
will have a better record of compliance. Political representatives from
countries with disproportionate influence over EU decision-making are more
likely to feel they have been granted a ‘fair’ and ‘just’ opportunity to repre-
sent their national interests. They are therefore also more likely to feel that
the substance of EU laws is fair. In fact, precisely because of the perceived
legitimacy and fairness of EU decision-making rules, European law will
acquire greater normative force amongst political actors in smaller, over-
represented states (see Simmons, 1998). The appearance of fairness in EU
decision-making processes is also important since it might be expected to
reduce resentment, opposition and negative mobilization by regulated parties.
Conversely, despite commanding greater absolute voting power, 
we expect larger, populous states to feel more aggrieved by the (under-)
apportionment of votes and EU voting rules. Thus, unable automatically to
convert their size into influence over EU decision-making, political repre-
sentatives from larger, underrepresented states are likely to look on EU law-
making arrangements, and, indeed, EU laws themselves, as ‘unfair’.
Particularly where large, powerful member states lose out to a winning
coalition of smaller states over an issue of national importance, such
grievances may assume wider political salience. Indeed, they are likely to fuel
anti-European sentiment amongst the wider public, with negative con-
sequences for state compliance. Where citizens feel that EU policies are being
dictated or unduly influenced by smaller, less powerful states, therefore,
domestic political actors may gain electoral capital from openly defying EU
directives. Either way, the result will be a worse record of implementation.
Research method
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable – that is, our measure of the degree of legal non-
compliance with EU Directives – is the annual number of infringement cases
raised against individual member states. These data are taken from the
European University Institute’s Database on EU Member State Compliance
with Community Law and cover 15 member states for the period 1978–99
(European University Institute, n.d.).
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The use of infringement data requires some explanation. Infringement
cases cover only a fraction of the total number of legal infractions committed
by member states in any year (Börzel, 2001; Bursens, 2002; Mastenbroek,
2003). There are two reasons for this. One is that not all cases of potential non-
compliance are detected (McCormick, 1999; Weale et al., 2000). Another is 
that only a small proportion of potential infringements brought to the
Commission’s attention are prosecuted, with the majority of cases being
resolved informally (Börzel, 2001; Davies, 2001; Weale et al., 2000).
The existence of unrevealed non-compliance inevitably reduces the
explanatory power of our statistical estimations. However, provided that
unrevealed cases are randomly distributed across the sample, they should not
invalidate the use of infringement data in the present context. There are two
possible scenarios where this assumption might not hold. First, rates of
detection and reporting of non-compliance may vary between member states
(Mastenbroek, 2003); and, second, the Commission might be more willing to
prosecute certain states than others.
Yet, investigating these scenarios, Börzel (2001) found scant evidence of
systematic bias. According to Börzel, neither societal activism nor state moni-
toring capacity – two factors that might conceivably bias disclosure – are
related to the number of national infringements. Similarly, she found no
consistent relationship between country rankings by total infringements to
any of the factors – state power, level of Euro-scepticism, etc. – previously
hypothesized to influence the Commission’s willingness to initiate official
proceedings. These observations, of course, do not entirely rule out the
existence of systematic bias. Yet they do suggest that some of the potential
biases typically considered in the literature may be relatively unimportant.
Of the possible infringement stages, we opt for so-called reasoned
opinions as our main dependent variable. These represent the first fully
‘official’ indication that a member state is failing to comply with its legal
obligations and are especially well suited to the present research task. Unlike
formal letters, reasoned opinions exclude a substantial share of infringement
cases arising from ambiguities and misunderstandings of EU law, neither of
which are of central interest in the present study. At the same time, unlike
referrals to the ECJ, reasoned opinions do not exclude potentially instructive
cases of non-compliance. Only the most persistent and intransigent cases of
non-compliance end up being referred to the ECJ, with the result that a large
number of genuine cases of non-compliance are missing from referrals
statistics (Börzel, 2001). Despite our preference for reasoned opinions, we
additionally report results for ECJ referrals. These are correlated with
reasoned opinions at r = .68 and are similar to the dependent variable used
in Mbaye (2001).
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Main explanatory variables
Similar to scholars who have studied the effect of economic membership
benefits on citizen support for European integration (Anderson and Reichert,
1996; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1994; Gabel and Whitten, 1997), we measure the
influence of a country’s trade dependence on other EU states using the share
of intra-EU trade as a percentage of a member state’s overall world trade,
calculated using data from the OECD (2005). As our measure of redistribu-
tive fiscal benefits, we employ data from Rodden (2002) on real net transfers
from the EU per capita. From the same source, we take our measure of politi-
cal benefits, namely, an index of a priori voting power per capita, which is
the average of voting power within: (i) the Council under unanimity rules;
(ii) the Council under QMV rules; and (iii) the Parliament.2 Rodden (2002)
uses the Shapey–Shubik (SS) formula to compute his indices of voting power.
The SS index considers all possible coalition permutations and represents the
fraction of all coalition permutations for which the vote of a particular actor
– in this case, political representatives from a member state – is critical. By
weighting the SS index on a per capita basis, Rodden’s measure provides us
with a more relevant indicator of a priori voting power, capturing differences
in states’ potential power to shape outcomes relative to their population size.
In order to ensure that our measure truly captures political benefits in the
form of disproportionate potential influence over decision-making, and is not
simply a proxy for country size, we include the natural log of population size
as a control variable.
Control variables
As well as our explanatory variables capturing different aspects of member-
ship benefits, we include several control variables. These do not include
several ‘institutional variables’ (e.g. policy styles) identified in past qualitative
studies as determinants of compliance (Knill, 2001). Although such idiosyn-
cratic institutional characteristics are useful in explaining cross-national vari-
ations in the implementation of particular Directives, it remains unclear
whether their influence extends to all Directives. Instead, we restrict our focus
to well-established generic determinants.
Our first variable is (the log of) population size, which, as noted above,
is included to ensure that our measure of political benefits is not simply
picking up a country size effect (data from World Bank, 2003). The next two
variables seek to capture a country’s ability to comply with the requirements
of EU directives. The first is bureaucratic quality, widely identified in previous
work as a positive correlate of legal compliance (Börzel et al., 2004; Falkner
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et al., 2004; Hille and Knill, 2006; Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998; Mbaye, 2001;
Weale et al., 2000). We measure bureaucratic quality using a score provided
by the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, 2004), which runs from
1 (worst) to 4 (best). The second capacity variable is GDP per capita. All else
equal, richer countries are likely to have a better legal, fiscal and admin-
istrative infrastructure to comply with Directives. Data are taken from Heston
et al. (2002).
A fourth control variable is political constraints, which have been shown
to limit the ability of executives to transpose Directives into domestic law
(Giuliani, 2003; Haverland, 2000; Steunenberg, 2006). In the present study, we
use an index of political constraints developed by Henisz (2000) to capture
these restrictions on political authority. The index measures the extent to
which political actors are constrained in their future policy choices by the
existence of other political actors with veto power.
A fifth control variable is EU membership length. Countries that have
been members of the EU for longer breach its laws more often than do more
recently acceded countries (Giuliani, 2003; Mbaye, 2001). A number of
possible explanations for this observed relationship exist, although perhaps
the most plausible is that recent entrants are more eager to demonstrate their
status as ‘legitimate’ members of the EU by fully complying with its rules
(Bengtsson et al., 2004). As our measure of membership length we take the
natural log of the number of years of EU membership, because the negative
influence of EU membership length is unlikely to increase linearly with time.
As a caveat, it is important to acknowledge that the Commission has histori-
cally granted accession states a ‘grace period’ of approximately two years,
during which time they have been exempt from their obligations to imple-
ment Directives (Börzel, 2001; Sverdrup, 2004). To account for this newcomer
effect, we include a dummy variable for the first two years after accession,
which we expect to have a negative effect on the number of infringements
received.
Our final set of control variables consists of dummy variables for the legal
system, distinguishing between countries with Scandinavian civil law
(Denmark, Finland and Sweden), French civil law (Belgium, France, Greece,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), German civil law
(Austria and Germany) and common law (Ireland and United Kingdom). The
omitted (reference) category in the estimations is the Scandinavian civil law
category (data taken from La Porta et al., 1999). The importance of legal
systems stems from their influence over the process of legal incorporation
(Alter, 2000). Relevant here are styles of conflict management, the com-
plexity of legal procedures and norms of compliance, all of which can
potentially facilitate and/or impede transposition. Indeed, legal characteristics
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– specifically, a low degree of litigiousness, procedural simplicity and norms
of ‘faithful compliance’ – are said to explain the comparatively low number
of infringement proceedings taken against the EU’s Nordic states, particularly
beyond the formal letters stage (Bengtsson et al., 2004; Bursens, 2002; 
Goldsmith and Larsen, 2004; Sverdrup, 2004). Table 2 provides summary
descriptive variable statistics.
Estimation technique
We estimate the following model
yit = α + β1xit + γtTt + uit.
The subscript i represents each member state of the EU in year t, y is the
number of legal infringements and x is the vector of explanatory variables.
The year-specific dummy variables T are of particular importance in the
context of the present study, capturing general developments common to all
member states but changing over time. They include annual increases in the
number of Directives, which might plausibly affect member state compliance.
Additionally, they also include modifications to the procedures used by the
Commission to record official infringements (Börzel, 2001); changes in the
Commission’s willingness to pursue infringement proceedings against
member states; developments in the European legal regime for enforcing 
and sanctioning non-compliance (Alter, 2000); as well as institutional
European Union Politics 8(2)1 9 6
Table 2 Descriptive summary variable statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Reasoned opinions 259 22.247 18.722 0 94
ECJ referrrals 256 6.223 6.540 0 36
Intra-EU trade (% of world trade) 259 65.420 7.876 46.974 80.471
Net transfers from EU p.c. 259 0.053 0.199 –0.253 0.770
Political power in EU institutions p.c. 259 0.012 0.022 0.001 0.105
Population (logged) 259 16.403 1.489 12.800 18.222
Bureaucratic quality 259 3.672 0.550 2 4
GDP p.c. (logged) 259 9.774 0.259 9.170 10.675
Index of political constraints 259 0.759 0.088 0.350 0.890
EU membership length (logged) 259 2.934 0.907 0 3.871
Period of grace 259 0.066 0.248 0 1
Common law 259 0.170 0.376 0 1
French civil law 259 0.602 0.490 0 1
German civil law 259 0.104 0.306 0 1
developments such as Treaty revisions and enlargement (Börzel et al., 2004).
Year-specific time dummies can control for all these developments, so long
as they affect all member states approximately equally, without the need for 
explicitly controlling for each factor.
Because the dependent variable is a discrete, strictly positive count
variable, ordinary least squares (OLS) is not well suited as a regression tech-
nique because its underlying distributional assumption is that of a normally
distributed continuous variable. A common technique for count data is an esti-
mator based on the assumption that the underlying data are Poisson dis-
tributed. However, it implicitly assumes that the conditional mean and the
variance functions of the dependent variable are equal. If this assumption is
violated, then Poisson regression is overly anti-conservative and under-
estimates the standard errors of variables (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). We
therefore use a popular alternative that does not make this assumption, namely
the negative binomial regression, together with standard errors that are robust
toward arbitrary heteroscedasticity. The presence of autocorrelation can create
problems for statistical inference. We therefore tested for autocorrelation in our
panel data, using Wooldridge’s (2002) F-test for panel data. Autocorrelation
would call for clustering observations at the panel level, which then produces
consistent, but inefficient, estimations. Fortunately, our test results clearly fail
to reject the hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation.
Results
Table 3 shows our estimation results. We concentrate first on reasoned
opinions as the dependent variable. As expected, the coefficient for share of
intra-EU trade dependence is negative and statistically significant. Likewise,
we estimate a negative and statistically significant relationship between
voting power per capita in EU institutions and the number of reasoned
opinions issued by the Commission. Similar estimations are obtained for ECJ
referrals: coefficients for share of intra-EU trade dependence and for voting
power per capita are both negative and statistically significant.
Yet, contrary to expectations, we estimate a positive and statistically
significant relationship between net fiscal transfers per capita and legal
infringements. Countries benefiting most from the EU budget are more likely
to have a greater number of reasoned opinions and, indeed, ECJ referrals.
This result is very robust to permutations in the possible ways of measuring
fiscal benefits. For example, replacing the preferred measure with net trans-
fers relative to GDP, with a transfer to payments ratio or with gross transfers
rather than net transfers leads to the same surprising result.
Perkins and Neumayer Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance? 1 9 7
Regarding our control variables, for reasoned opinions as the dependent
variable, only bureaucratic quality, the period of grace and the legal system
dummies are statistically significant with the anticipated coefficient signs.
Countries with higher bureaucratic quality and newly acceded states have
fewer infringements. Member states with a common law, French civil law or
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Table 3 Estimation results
Reasoned ECJ
opinions referrals
Intra-EU trade (% of world trade) –0.023 –0.026
(3.02)*** (2.66)***
Net transfers from EU p.c. 0.562 1.278
(2.56)** (3.23)***
Political power in EU institutions p.c. –6.954 –13.601
(1.99)** (2.67)***
Population (logged) –0.055 –0.116
(0.84) (1.23)
Bureaucratic quality –0.272 –0.681
(2.16)** (4.57)***
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.234 0.973
(0.78) (2.38)**
Index of political constraints 0.772 1.684
(1.53) (2.60)***
EU membership length (logged) 0.084 0.536
(0.90) (4.07)***
Period of grace –1.228 –0.781
(3.71)*** (1.81)*
Common law 0.895 1.160
(4.50)*** (4.02)***
French civil law 1.594 1.965
(7.26)** (6.51)***
German civil law 1.385 –1.630
(5.58)** (4.83)***
No. of observations 259 259
No. of countries 15 15
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.17
Wald test 954.7 538.2
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Panel test of autocorrelation 0.158 1.656
(0.6972) (0.2190)
Notes: Estimation is done by negative binomial regression with robust standard errors. Constant
and year-specific time dummies are included, but coefficients are not reported. Wald test is
asymptotically chi-squared distributed with p-value in brackets. Wooldridge’s (2002) panel test of
autocorrelation is an F-test with p-values in brackets. 
* significant at .1 level ** at .05 level *** at .01 level.
German civil law tradition all have a higher number of infringements than
countries with a Scandinavian legal system, the omitted reference category.
For ECJ referrals, in addition to the control variables already mentioned, EU
membership length and the index of political constraints have the anticipated
positive effect. Surprisingly, countries with a higher GDP per capita face more
ECJ referrals.3 Population size is not statistically significant in either
estimation.
Discussion and conclusion
Countries’ participation in the EU integrationist project has historically been
sold on the basis of the various benefits that accrue to members. Indeed,
precisely because of these rewards, it is suggested that it is in the self-
interests of member states to ensure the functioning of the EU through the
proper application of its laws. In this paper, we explore whether member
states respond to this logic. That is, do states that benefit more from member-
ship have a better record of complying with EU laws?
With a view to answering this question, we use quantitative regression
techniques to estimate the influence of several hypothesized benefits on the
number of infringements for 15 member states over the period 1978–99. Our
findings provide overall support for the idea that compliance with Directives
is influenced by the level of benefits derived from the EU. As anticipated,
states with higher levels of intra-EU trade dependence are subject to fewer
infringements, presumably because such countries are amongst the chief
beneficiaries of a common set of rules that promote the stable, predictable
and impediment-free movement of goods and services (Mattli, 1999).4 Simi-
larly, to the extent that per capita voting power in EU institutions is nega-
tively correlated with legal infringements, our results suggest that countries
deriving greater political benefits from European integration relative to their
country size have a better record of compliance.
Our only surprising result concerns fiscal transfers. Whereas we would
intuitively expect member states receiving more from the EU budget in per
capita terms to have a better record of compliance, our results suggest that
such countries are actually subject to more infringements. What might
explain this counter-intuitive result? One possible explanation for the
absence of a positive relationship is that, in reality, financial transfers have
little or no influence over the willingness of member state governments to
make the potentially costly domestic adjustments required to comply with
EU law. Although inconsistent with several strands of European integration
theory, this reasoning nevertheless squares with the findings of recent work
on foreign aid to developing countries and the recipient country’s quality of
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governance. According to several studies, foreign aid granted to low-income
countries has not improved institutional quality, despite some donors re-
quiring recipients to improve their governance as a condition of assistance
(e.g. see Bräutigam and Knack, 2004).
More puzzling, perhaps, is the apparent existence of a positive relation-
ship between EU transfers and non-compliance. Although we readily admit
that there may be a range of possible explanations for this relationship, we
offer two of the most potentially plausible here. One is that the transfer
variable picks up an effect of insufficient capacity to comply with EU
Directives in recipient countries, which is not fully captured by our variables
measuring state capacity. Thus, separating transfers into agricultural,
Structural (regional development) and other funds – using data taken from
Rodden (2002) – we find that both agricultural and other funds have a
negative coefficient, although neither is statistically significant. Conversely,
Structural Funds have a positive and highly statistically significant effect
(detailed results are available from the authors on request). Truly com-
parable data on disaggregated transfers are available only for 1995 onwards,
meaning that these findings need to be treated with considerable caution. Yet
they tentatively suggest that the positive correlation between transfers and
non-compliance reflects the higher level of financial support given by the EU
to precisely those member states that are least capable of complying with
European legal requirements.
A second possible explanation is that our transfer variable captures an
effect of Euroscepticism. It may be that more Eurosceptic countries receive
more transfers, largely in order to secure their support for continued inte-
gration. And since governments in countries whose populations are less
supportive of European integration might plausibly be less willing to comply
with EU Directives, this might explain the positive sign of our estimated
coefficient. Indeed, this interpretation would be consistent with Carrubba
(1997), who found evidence that countries with more Eurosceptic electorates
receive more transfers. According to Carrubba, EU transfers potentially
function as a tool to further integration, with more pro-integrationist states
willing to ‘bankroll’ less pro-integrationist ones with a view to gaining their
support for deepening the EU. Supporting this assertion, Zimmer et al. (2005)
found evidence of a redistributive cleavage in the Council of Ministers, with
conflict and negotiation structured around financial transfers. Thus, the
preferences of poorer, net recipient states tend to be oriented towards
additional financial transfers, whereas richer, net donor states tend to
advocate further liberalization of the Single Market.
Our findings have a number of wider implications. First, they suggest
that the implementation of Directives is shaped by the generic benefits
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derived from membership of the EU. Past research has similarly hypothesized
a role for benefits in motivating compliance. However, the primary emphasis
of previous work has been on the benefits associated with individual policies
and on the role of nationally idiosyncratic institutional factors in shaping
these (Börzel, 2000; Knill, 2001). By contrast, we find evidence that the wider,
diffuse rewards associated with European polity, policy and governance also
influence member states’ compliance with EU Directives. The importance of
reciprocity, benefits and rewards in providing the nation-state with the
legitimacy to govern has long been recognized by scholars of domestic
government. Our study is unique in providing support for the role of such
factors in shaping countries’ willingness to implement EU law.
Second, our findings suggest that theories of European integration are
right to emphasize economic and political rewards in political unification. The
implementation of a harmonized body of EU law is crucial to the success of
the EU integrationist project (Mattli, 1999). To the extent that we find that a
larger share of intra-EU to total trade and per capita voting power in
European institutions influence the implementation of EU law, our study
supports theoretical predictions regarding the role of membership benefits in
fostering commitment to European unification (Rosamond, 2000).
At the same time, our results underline the need to distinguish between
different membership rewards. That intra-EU trade and per capita voting
power emerge as statistically significant predictors of compliance, but net
transfers do not, strongly indicates that not all rewards translate into
increased commitment to European integration. Clearly, certain types of
benefit are more influential than others.
Yet, although these differences might seem puzzling, it is worth noting
that they are not necessarily inconsistent with theories of integration.
Traditional and revised neo-functionalist accounts, in particular, have long
privileged cross-border transactions, and especially economic exchanges, as
a central catalyst for European integration (Haas, 1958; Nye, 1971; Sandholtz
and Stone Sweet, 1998). Similarly, intergovernmental approaches have recog-
nized instrumental political authority and power as a central driver of
European integration. Although side-payments have been mentioned as a
means for gaining the support of interest groups, they have rarely been
assigned the same explanatory significance as either cross-border economic
transactions or political authority and power (Lindberg and Scheingold,
1970). Hence the empirical findings presented in our paper are not entirely
without theoretical precedent.
Third, from a policy perspective, our findings suggest that fiscal 
transfers are not a panacea for compliance problems. Although payments
may encourage member states to accede to the EU and sign up to its rules
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(Mattli, 1999), they do not guarantee the implementation of these rules.
Instead, if policy-makers wish to use fiscal transfers as an incentive for
compliance, they might need to make redistributive payments far more
conditional. Whether such a move is possible, or indeed economically, politi-
cally or ethically desirable, is open to discussion. However, our findings
should caution policy-makers against the intuitive assumption that transfers
foster compliance.
Notes
We thank three anonymous referees for many constructive comments. Eric
Neumayer gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Leverhulme Trust.
1 Note, we do not believe that the strength of opposition to such Directives 
will be significantly greater in countries with high levels of intra-EU trade
dependence.
2 A referee rightly pointed out that our measure of a priori voting power should
ideally be adjusted for temporal changes in EU voting rules and in the relative
importance of the European Council versus the Parliament in EU decision-
making. Unfortunately, these dynamics are highly complex and we therefore
resort to a simple average.
3 Note, however, that dropping the bureaucratic quality variable from the
model renders the GDP per capita variable statistically insignificant.
4 A reviewer noted that this result could be subject to simultaneity bias:
countries with a good compliance record will trade more with EU countries
if compliance with Directives promotes intra-EU trade (e.g. because of re-
ductions in tariffs before the Single Market and in non-tariff barriers). We
have no good instrumental variables to address this issue directly. However,
our results are upheld if we lag the trade variable by one or two years, which
should reduce any potentially existing simultaneity bias.
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